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Prosocial lies, or lies intended to benefit others, are ubiquitous behaviors that have important 
social and economic consequences. Though emotions play a central role in many forms of 
prosocial behavior, no work has investigated how emotions influence behavior when one has the 
opportunity to tell a prosocial lie—a situation that presents a conflict between two prosocial 
ethics: lying to prevent harm to another, and honesty, which might also provide benefits to the 
target of the lie. Here, we examine whether the emotion of compassion influences prosocial 
lying, and find that compassion causally increases and positively predicts prosocial lying. In 
Studies 1 and 2, participants evaluated a poor-quality essay and provided feedback to the essay 
writer. Experimentally induced compassion felt towards the essay writer (Study 1) and individual 
differences in trait compassion (Study 2) were positively associated with inflated feedback to the 
essay writer. In both of these studies, the relationship between compassion and prosocial lying 
was partially mediated by an enhanced desire to prevent emotional harm. In Study 3, we found 
moderation such that experimentally induced compassion increased lies that resulted in financial 
gains for a charity, but not lies that produced financial gains for the self. This research 
illuminates the emotional underpinnings of the common yet morally complex behavior of 
prosocial lying, and builds on work highlighting the potentially harmful effects of compassion—
an emotion typically seen as socially beneficial. 
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Lying Because We Care: 
Compassion Increases Prosocial Lying 
When people are asked to report their most important moral value, the most frequent 
response is honesty (Graham, Meindl, Koleva, Iyer, & Johnson, 2015). Nevertheless, people 
report lying several times daily on average (DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & Epstein, 
1996). Many of these lies are told with the intention of benefiting others in some way, thus 
earning the classification “prosocial lie” (Levine & Schweitzer, 2014; 2015).  
Despite the benevolent intentions behind prosocial lies, however, it is often the case that 
when given the opportunity to tell a prosocial lie, both lying and honesty can have different 
prosocial—and antisocial—consequences. For example, imagine a professor is asked by an 
undergraduate advisee to review his application essays for a prestigious doctoral program. After 
reading the essays, the professor thinks it unlikely that the student would be accepted into the 
program. Knowing that the student cares deeply about his academic identity and that he has put 
several months’ effort into the materials, the professor believes the truth would be devastating to 
the student. At the same time, the professor understands that honest feedback will give the 
student an opportunity to revise the essays and significantly improve his chances at admission.  
If the professor were to experience a rush of compassion for the student, how would it 
impact whether or not the professor gives the student honest feedback? One possibility is that 
compassion would lead the professor to consider the benefits of the honest feedback, and drive 
the professor to tell the student the hurtful, but beneficial truth. That is, compassion could 
promote a focus on the student’s career goals and help the professor see past the temporary 
emotional consequences of the feedback. Alternatively, compassion could instead focus the 
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professor on the negative emotional impact of the feedback, and lead the professor to tell a lie in 
the form of overly positive feedback. 
 In this paper, we explore, for the first time, the emotional basis of prosocial lying. 
Specifically, we examine how and why compassion impacts behavior when one has the 
opportunity to tell a prosocial lie. Determining how compassion influences prosocial lying is 
important for predicting the circumstances under which these lies might be told, as well as for 
developing an understanding of the counterintuitive and potentially detrimental effects of 
compassion on individuals, relationships, and organizations. 
The Benefits and Limitations of Compassion 
 Compassion is an emotion elicited by appraisals of need or undeserved suffering (Goetz, 
Keltner, & Simon-Tomas, 2010; Haidt, 2003; Lazarus, 1991).1 Compassion is evoked by 
witnessing or learning about others’ physical or emotional pain (Batson et al., 1997; Condon & 
DeSteno, 2011; Eisenberg et al., 1989; Stellar, Cohen, Oveis, & Keltner, 2014; Stellar, Feinberg, 
& Keltner, 2014; Stellar, Manzo, Kraus, & Keltner, 2012; Van Kleef et al., 2008) or 
victimization (Cameron & Payne, 2011; Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011a), and by viewing 
depictions of suffering others such as homeless and malnourished people (Oveis et al., 2009; 
Oveis, Horberg, & Keltner, 2010). Philosophers and psychologists consider compassion to be the 
prototypical prosocial emotion, as it guides decisions about whom to help and how to help them 
(e.g., Cameron & Payne, 2012; Haidt, 2003; Nussbaum, 1996).  
                                                   
1 Others have labeled this emotion and related states as sympathy, empathy, or empathic concern 
(Batson, 1991; Batson & Shaw, 1991; Davis, 1983; Eisenberg, 1991; Eisenberg, 2002; Goetz et 
al., 2010; Lazarus, 1991; Nussbaum, 1996; Wispé, 1986; see Haidt, 2003 for a discussion of 
construct terminology). 
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Because compassion involves appraisals of suffering in others, it is no surprise that this 
emotion facilitates prosocial behaviors aimed at alleviating suffering and harm. For example, 
participants induced to experience compassion become more willing to receive painful electric 
shocks in place of other people (see Batson & Shaw, 1991 for a review). Those experiencing 
compassion will also help others even if they can escape the situation without doing so (Batson, 
Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981). Non-verbal behaviors aimed to reduce suffering 
have been observed cross-culturally, including soothing touch and skin-to-skin contact 
(Hertenstein, Keltner, App, Bulleit, & Jaskolka, 2006). Compassion is also a motivator of 
generosity towards those who suffer (Saslow et al., 2013).  
Not only does compassion facilitate prosocial behaviors that involve preventing suffering 
and harm, but it is also plays a role in behaviors that promote the welfare of others. When a 
person experiences compassion, their focus turns away from the goals and needs of the self and 
toward enhancing the welfare of others (Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011; Oveis et al., 2010; 
Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2011b). As such, research suggests that compassion facilitates behaviors 
intended to help others, even at a cost to oneself. For example, compassion promotes forgiveness 
(Condon & DeSteno, 2011; Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, & Weiner, 2004), increases 
volunteerism (Omoto, Malsch, & Barraza 2009), and facilitates cooperation (Singer & Steinbeis, 
2009). 
Despite the multitude of work highlighting compassion’s central role in prosocial 
behavior, however, researchers have recently begun documenting the limitations of compassion, 
as well as conditions under which this emotion can actually have perverse effects. An underlying 
theme of this work is that compassion is associated with biases that can sometimes misguide our 
attention away from doing the “most good.” This idea is well-illustrated by the story of Baby 
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Jessica, who enraptured media attention and brought in hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
charitable donations after falling down a well, while elsewhere in the world, humanitarian crises 
such as the Kurdish genocide (which resulted in hundreds of thousands of lives being lost) 
received little attention. Individuals experience more compassion towards identifiable victims 
than relatively greater numbers of victims described using statistics (Small & Loewenstein, 
2003), and people downregulate their compassion when they encounter multiple victims in need 
because those needs appear overwhelming (Cameron & Payne, 2011). Compassion is also more 
easily and more often felt for those whose suffering is vivid (Loewenstein & Small, 2007), and 
in-group members, such as those who are closely related (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & 
Neuberg, 1997), or those who share our ethnicity or nationality (Stürmer, Snyder, Kropp, & 
Siem, 2006). It has been argued that the biased nature of compassion is a contributing factor to 
neglect of the world’s greatest atrocities, the rectification of which requires overcoming of these 
biases so that people may recognize and act where help is needed most (Bloom, 2014; Slovic, 
2007). 
Prosocial and Selfish Lying  
 Prosocial lying is ethically ambiguous. On one hand, lying violates the principle of 
honesty, a widely held moral value (Graham et al., 2015). Yet, these lies differ in their intentions 
from selfish lies, or those which are told to benefit oneself, potentially at the expense of others 
(Levine & Schweitzer, 2014). Selfish lies, such as those told for personal monetary gain, to 
protect one’s status or position, or to attain social approval, are commonly viewed as 
reprehensible (Buller & Burgoon, 1994; Lewis & Saarni, 1993). In contrast, prosocial lies are 
colored by people’s good intentions, such as to prevent others from feeling hurt or embarrassed 
(DePaulo et al., 1996), or to benefit others financially (Erat & Gneezy, 2012).  
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 It is important to note, however, that prosocial lies are benevolent in intent, but not 
necessarily in their ultimate consequences. That is, although those who tell prosocial lies have 
good intentions, these lies can have harmful effects on others. Providing overly positive feedback 
(such as in the professor-student example earlier) is one such context in which prosocial lies can 
ultimately backfire. Inflated feedback can harm performance (Ellis, Mendel, & Aloni-Zohar, 
2009) and lead to avoidance of challenges (Brummelman, Thomaes, Orobio de Castro, 
Overbeek, & Bushman, 2014), which could have negative economic consequences for 
organizations. Conversely, research has documented clear benefits to receiving accurate 
performance feedback. Accurate feedback can foster motivation to achieve goals and improve 
performance (Hyland, 1988; Ilgen, Fisher & Taylor, 1979; Locke & Latham, 1990). Research in 
organizational behavior has demonstrated the importance of accurate feedback for workplace 
productivity (Hillman, Schwandt, & Bartz, 1990), as well for clarifying expectations and 
reducing employee uncertainty (Ashford & Cummings, 1983). Thus, while prosocial lies are 
intended to benefit others, they may ultimately have detrimental effects on individuals and 
organizations. 
Because of the adverse consequences that can result from prosocial lies, scholars across 
several domains of psychology (social, developmental, organizational behavior) and behavioral 
economics have sought to better understand these lies through research. One clear finding is that 
prosocial lying is ubiquitous. Prosocial lying is socialized early in life; parents lie to their 
children to promote positive emotions (Heyman, Luu, & Lee, 2009), and children in turn 
understand and tell prosocial lies themselves (Broomfield, Robinson, & Robinson, 2002; Talwar 
et al., 2007). Adults also tell prosocial lies regularly, especially in close relationships (DePaulo & 
Kashy, 1998). Recent research has focused on responses to prosocial lying: Whereas selfish lies 
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generally lead to distrust of the liar, prosocial lies that provide clear economic benefits to the 
target of the lie (hereafter “target”) can increase trust and positive moral evaluations of the liar 
(Levine & Schweitzer, 2014; 2015). Yet, when the benefits of lying do not clearly outweigh 
those of honesty in the eyes of the target, prosocial lies can harm trust and moral judgments, and 
communicating benevolent intent may do little to mitigate these negative effects (Lupoli, Levine, 
& Greenberg, 2016). Other work has focused on predictors of prosocial lying: Research reveals 
that people are more likely to lie when others stand to gain (Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2013; Gino & 
Pierce, 2009; Wiltermuth, 2011), and prosocial lying is observed even when there is a cost to the 
self (Erat & Gneezy, 2012). Thus far, however, no work has examined what is likely a critical 
antecedent of prosocial lying: emotion, and in particular, the emotion of compassion. 
Compassion and Prosocial Lying  
 Considering that compassion facilitates prosocial behavior, it seems likely that 
compassion would play some role in prosocial lying. What complicates matters, however, is that 
prosocial lying may not necessarily be the most beneficial action to take when considering 
targets’ interests, because the alternative to prosocial lying might be helpful to them as well. 
When faced with the opportunity to tell a prosocial lie, two prosocial ethics are pitted against one 
another. Individuals must either lie in order to reduce harm or provide care to another, or tell the 
truth, which could also provide benefits for the target. Thus far, it is unclear how compassion 
influences behavior in moral dilemmas when different prosocial values are in conflict. In what 
direction might compassion influence prosocial lying, if any? Answering this question is critical 
to understanding compassion’s influence on moral behavior, and this knowledge could inform 
policy initiatives aimed at increasing compassion in society and in organizations (e.g., Rynes, 
Bartunek, Dutton, & Margolis, 2012). 
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 On one hand, compassion could decrease prosocial lying (and thus produce increased 
honesty) for two reasons. First, when faced with the opportunity to tell a prosocial lie, those 
experiencing compassion might consider what is in the overall best interest of the target. As 
noted earlier, compassion has been shown to result in both harm-preventing behaviors, as well as 
behaviors that promote the wellbeing of others in ways unrelated to suffering. While no work has 
addressed how compassion influences behavior when harm prevention and non-harm-related 
welfare promotion are in conflict, one possibility is that compassion leads individuals to do 
whatever provides the greatest magnitude of benefits for others. Thus, if the benefits of a hurtful 
truth clearly outweigh the temporary pain inflicted by the truth, compassion could then lead an 
individual to be more honest. Recall the aforementioned example of the professor asked to 
evaluate the student’s essays: Although hearing that that he is unlikely to be accepted would be 
painful, this would be a small price if honest criticism helps him improve his application and 
ultimately gain admission. A compassionate individual might then be honest with the student 
about the flaws in his application. 
 Second, because lies have damaging effects on relationships, compassion may make 
individuals averse to telling lies in general. Deception can harm relationships by decreasing 
liking (Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006), intimacy (DePaulo et al., 1996), and trust 
(Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006), and can also provoke revenge (Boles, Croson, & 
Murnighan, 2000). Additionally, in close relationships, such as friendships and romantic 
relationships, there are strong expectations of honesty (Stiff, Kim, & Ramesh, 1992). The 
discovery that one has been lied to can have negative emotional effects on the lie recipient, and 
damage or destroy the relationship (Haselton, Buss, Oubaid, & Angleitner, 2005; McCornack & 
Levine, 1990). It is possible that a lifetime of exposure to the harmful consequences of lying in 
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general could have spillover effects towards perceptions of prosocial lying. Thus, one 
experiencing compassion might opt to uphold the social contract of honesty, in part because of 
the detrimental effects that lying could have on one’s relationships.  
 On the other hand, because compassion involves a heightened sensitivity to the suffering 
of others, this emotion could increase prosocial lying by focusing individuals on the harm 
inherent in a painful truth. That is, if lying is seen as a means to prevent or decrease suffering, 
then compassion might increase this type of lying. Consistent with this analysis is 
aforementioned work showing that compassion’s effects on prosocial behavior are not 
necessarily calibrated toward promoting the most welfare-enhancing behavior, but instead 
toward promoting the welfare of others whose suffering is vivid (Loewenstein & Small, 2007). 
The circumstances under which lies are told lend well to compassion’s biases: Lies are often told 
face-to-face, whereby the target is identifiable (e.g., Small & Loewenstein, 2003), and the pain 
that might result from the truth would be immediately apparent (i.e., vivid) to the potential 
deceiver. If the perceived harm that honesty might cause to the target is to be experienced in the 
here-and-now, compassion could act as a catalyst for prosocial lying in order to avoid this harm. 
The Present Studies 
 In three studies, we provide the first tests of the influence of compassion on prosocial 
lying. We approach compassion at three levels (Han, Lerner, & Keltner, 2007; Rosenberg, 1998): 
as an experimentally-induced state experienced toward the potential target of a prosocial lie, or 
integral compassion; as an enduring emotional trait; and as an experimentally-induced state 
elicited by stimuli unrelated to the potential target of a prosocial lie, or incidental compassion. 
We also test whether a particular cognitive mechanism concerning the welfare of others—the 
importance placed on preventing emotional harm—might underlie the relationship between 
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compassion and prosocial lying. Studies 1 and 2 examine prosocial lies that prevent emotional 
harm; Study 3 examines lies that promote the gains of others, while also investigating 
compassion’s influence on selfish lies. All three studies measure real behavior. 
Study 1:  
Integral Compassion Increases Prosocial Lies That Prevent Emotional Harm 
 Study 1 tested whether experimentally-induced compassion (versus neutral feelings) 
would influence prosocial lying. Prosocial lying was operationalized as the inflation of feedback 
to the writer of a poorly written essay, as compared to participants’ previous, private evaluations 
of that same essay. This behavioral paradigm simulates a regular occurrence in schools and 
workplaces in which individuals first evaluate an underperforming individual and then must 
decide whether to give accurate feedback.  
Study 1 employed an integral manipulation of compassion; that is, the person who 
elicited compassion in the participants was also the potential target of the prosocial lie. This type 
of manipulation allowed us to examine compassion’s relation to prosocial lying as it often occurs 
in the real world. We measured other emotions to test whether the effect of compassion on 
prosocial lying (if any) was driven by compassion specifically, rather than by other discrete 
emotions or positive or negative affect. We also measured social perceptions of the essay writer 
that could potentially account for the effect of compassion on prosocial lying. Lastly, we tested a 
potential cognitive mechanism of compassion’s influence on prosocial lying—an enhanced 
importance placed on preventing harm to others, which is a primary appraisal of compassion 
(Goetz et al., 2010)—as well as potential alternative mechanisms.  
Methods 
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Participants, design, and procedure. Participants were 434 undergraduates from a large 
U.S. public university. Participants were randomly assigned to the compassion or neutral 
condition in a two-cell between-subjects design. Twenty-four participants were excluded for 
failing an attention check, and nine participants were excluded for reporting suspicion that they 
were not actually paired with another individual. This left a final sample of 401 participants 
(Mage = 21.3, 54.6% female), which met our a priori target sample size of 400 (200 per cell). A 
sample of this size would give us 81% power to detect a small-to-medium effect size of d = .28 
(Cohen, 1992) at 𝛼 = .05. Though we did not have sufficient precedent to make a precise 
estimate of effect size, we used d = .28 in our power calculation as a lower bound of an effect 
size that would justify further study.   
 Participants completed the prosocial lying task (which included the compassion versus 
neutral manipulation), provided reports on their experienced emotions, and answered questions 
to assess potential mechanisms. Finally, we measured social perceptions of the writer to rule out 
potential confounding variables. 
Prosocial lying task. We adapted a behavioral measure of prosocial lying (Jampol & 
Zayas, 2016) in which participants first provided private ratings of an essay written by another 
individual. They then read about a recent experience in this individual’s life, which served as our 
manipulation of compassion or neutral feelings toward the essay writer. Next, they received a 
cover story explaining that they would have the opportunity to give the writer feedback, and that 
this feedback could help the writer improve the essay and thus improve his/her chance to earn a 
prize (see details below in section entitled, “Assessment of prosocial lying”). Finally, 
participants evaluated the essay a second time on the same dimensions, except this time with the 
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knowledge that their evaluations would be shared with the essay writer. This procedure is 
graphically depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of prosocial lying task in Study 1. 
 
As in Jampol and Zayas (2016), participants were first told that they would be paired with 
a student from another university who had written an essay about why he/she should be admitted 
to a graduate program. Participants were told that the purpose of the task was to let the researcher 
know (1) the quality of the student’s writing, and (2) whether the writing sample should be 
provided to students who are applying to graduate school as an example of good “off the cuff” 
writing—that is, writing not prepared in advance. To bolster the believability of the cover story 
and to increase the salience of an identifiable target, participants were provided with the 
student’s initials (“CG”) and a short introductory message from this ostensible partner. 
Participants were also provided with a description of criteria they would use to evaluate specific 
Participants were induced to 
experience either compassion 
or neutral feelings towards the 
writer
Participants read the same 
essay again, and provided 
ratings that would be 





Participants read and 
evaluated a poorly 
written essay
Participants learned that they 
would provide feedback to 
the writer, and that there 
were positive consequences 
of honest feedback
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
14 
essay attributes (i.e., focus, logic, organization, support, mechanics), and were given an example 
of a high quality essay. Participants then read and rated the essay, which was pretested to be of 
relatively low quality (N = 36, sample drawn from same student population; M = 44.56, SD = 
20.69; 0 = worst, 100 = best). 
Private essay evaluations. Participants first provided their private ratings of the essay. 
Participants rated quality by indicating how the essay ranks “in general, compared to the best 
writing from someone in your peer-group/students at your university” (0 = worst, 100 = best). 
Participants’ ratings of the focus, logic, organization, support, and mechanics of the essay—five 
attributes that are important in good essay writing, which were defined for participants—were 
averaged to form an attributes score (α = .62; 1 = worst, 5 = best). Finally, participants provided 
their recommendation for the essay (“How likely would you be to recommend this essay as a 
good example of off the cuff writing for students preparing for graduate admissions?”; 1 = very 
unlikely, 7 = very likely). At no point were participants told that the writer would learn their 
identity or view their evaluation; thus, they were free to give any ratings they wished without 
social repercussions.   
Manipulation of compassion versus neutral feelings toward the essay writer. After 
providing their initial private essay evaluations, participants received the manipulation of 
compassion or neutral feelings toward the writer. This manipulation was implemented in the 
form of a message ostensibly written by the essay writer about an event that recently occurred in 
his/her life. To reduce the potential for demand effects that could arise from identification of the 
purpose of this message, we told participants that they would receive this message because “we 
want to give you the chance to know him/her [the writer] better,” and that “he/she [the writer] 
was not given any specific instructions about what type of event he/she should write about.” 
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Participants randomly assigned to the compassion condition then read a short paragraph 
adapted from Stellar, Feinberg, and Keltner (2014) that depicted the experience of a family 
member’s death (with intentional spelling and punctuation errors to match the writing quality of 
the essay): 
I dont know if this will be interesting to you but the only thing I can think of is two days 
ago my cousin passed away. It was really hard for me since we were so close. I spent a 
lot of time with her when I was younger we were best friends as kids.  After I found out I 
just came home and sat in my room for a while by myself, my whole body was tired and I 
just felt so drained. I haven’t talked to anyone about it really… I just couldn’t believe it I, 
I wish I had gotten a chance to talk to her one last time. She was a really great person 
and she was a really big part of my life.  
Participants in the neutral condition read a paragraph about an ordinary grocery shopping 
experience. 
Assessment of prosocial lying. After receiving the emotion manipulation, participants 
were asked to provide feedback to the writer about the quality of his/her essay. To (a) make the 
benefits of honesty salient, and (b) reduce demand effects that might arise from the perception 
that participants were expected to inflate their shared evaluations, we presented the following 
explanation to participants before they provided their feedback: 
Your feedback is important. Each writer in this project must decide whether they would  
like to rewrite their essay before submitting it into a contest in which they can win a 
small prize that we will hold at the end of the semester. So, the information that you 
provide will help the writer improve his/her essay. 
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Participants again rated the quality and attributes of the essay and provided their 
recommendation for the essay on the same scales described above, but this time they received an 
on-screen reminder that their essay ratings would be shared with the essay writer. Private ratings 
on each evaluation criterion (essay quality, attributes, and recommendation) were subtracted 
from the shared ratings, and these difference scores served as the measures of prosocial lying. 
These three measures of prosocial lying were also standardized and averaged to form our focal 
measure of overall prosocial lying (α = .79). For all measures, the higher the difference score, 
the more participants inflated their ratings when giving feedback to the writer.  
Experienced emotions. After providing their shared ratings, participants were asked to 
think back to the message they read about the recent experience in the writer’s life (the emotion 
manipulation), and to indicate the extent to which they experienced several emotions while 
reading this message (1 = very slightly or not at all, 5 = extremely). Twenty of the items assessed 
were taken from the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988), and three additional items were used to assess compassion (“compassionate,” 
“sympathetic,” “moved”; Oveis et al., 2010). We calculated composite scores for positive affect 
(10 items: interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, proud, alert, inspired, determined, attentive, 
active; α = .86), negative affect (10 items: distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, 
ashamed, nervous, jittery, afraid; α = .79), and compassion (3 items, α = .89). The order of the 
emotion items was randomized for each participant. 
Mechanism: Harm prevention. A primary appraisal associated with compassion is a 
heightened focus on the suffering of others. Thus, we hypothesized that compassion’s influence 
on prosocial lying would be mediated by an enhanced desire to prevent emotional harm. To 
assess this mechanism, participants responded to the following prompt: “When you were giving 
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
17 
feedback to the student with whom you were paired during the second round of grading, how 
important was it for you to prevent any emotional harm or negative feelings that might have 
occurred as a result of your feedback?” (1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely important).  
We also assessed alternative potential mechanisms by asking participants to indicate on 
the same scale how important it was to “give honest feedback,” and how important it was to 
“give feedback that would help the student improve his/her writing.” All mechanism questions 
were presented in randomized order.  
Social perceptions. Next, we measured several perceptions of the writer. Participants 
were first asked, “How optimistic would you be about CG’s [the writer’s] success as a future 
graduate student?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very). They then received a series of questions on the same 
1 to 7 scale in the following format: “How ___ is CG?” Participants rated the writer on the 
following dimensions: smart, dominant, warm, agreeable, competent, confident, open, likeable, 
trusting, trustworthy.”  
On the next survey page, we asked participants to indicate their beliefs about the gender 
of the student with whom they were paired (1 = the student was very likely to be female, 2 = the 
student was probably female, 3 = the student could have been male or female, 4 = the student 
was probably male, 5 = the student was very likely to be male). Lastly, participants responded to 
several exploratory individual differences scales, which are reported in the Supplemental 
Material and do not moderate the results. 
Results 
Manipulation check. The compassion induction was successful: Participants in the 
compassion condition reported feeling more compassion (M = 3.15, SD = 1.02) than did those in 
the neutral condition (M = 1.46, SD = 0.64), t(399) = 19.93, p < .001, d = 1.99.  
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Overall levels of prosocial lying across conditions. The prosocial lying task 
successfully generated prosocial lying. The mean difference score for each evaluation criterion 
was positive, indicating that participants provided more positive evaluations when the writer 
would view those evaluations, compared to their private evaluations (Mquality = +2.94, SDquality = 
9.40; Mattributes = +0.10, SDattributes = 0.41; Mrecommendation = +0.33, SDrecommendation = 0.73). 
Furthermore, t-tests revealed that each of these difference scores significantly differed from zero 
(ps < .001), thus enabling us to reject the null hypothesis that no prosocial lying occurred.  
Compassion produced increased levels of prosocial lying. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, the compassion condition (Mcompassion = +0.16, SD = 0.85) produced increased 
overall prosocial lying compared to the neutral condition (Mneutral = -0.15, SD = 0.80), t(399) = 
3.74, p <.001, d =.37.2 Further, those in the compassion condition exhibited greater levels of 
prosocial lying in their ratings of quality (Mcompassion= +4.75, SD = 9.14 vs. Mneutral = +1.20, SD 
= 9.33; t(399) = 3.85, p <.001, d = .38), attributes (Mcompassion= +0.17, SD = 0.37 vs. Mneutral = 
+0.04, SD = 0.44; t(399) = 2.99, p <.01, d = .30), and recommendation (Mcompassion = +0.42 vs. 
SD = 0.80; Mneutral = +0.24, SD = 0.65; t(399) = 2.54, p = .01, d = .25; see Figure 2).  
 
                                                   
2 Note that overall prosocial lying scores are standardized.  




Figure 2. The effect of integral compassion on overall prosocial lying and prosocial lying on 
each of the evaluation criteria in Study 1. All scores are standardized. Error bars signify standard 
errors.  
 
Importance placed on harm prevention partially mediated the effect of compassion 
on prosocial lying. After establishing that the compassion induction significantly increased 
prosocial lying, we assessed whether compassion also increased the importance placed on 
preventing emotional harm or negative feelings. Indeed, those in the compassion condition 
reported a significantly greater importance placed on preventing emotional harm than those in 
the neutral condition, β = .39, p = .02. The importance placed on emotional harm also 
significantly predicted overall prosocial lying, β = .06, p = .02. We therefore examined the 
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method, a mediation model with 20,000 bootstrap resamples confirmed that the importance 
placed on preventing emotional harm was a partial mediator of the relationship between 
compassion and overall prosocial lying, β = .02, 95% CI [.001, .05]. In contrast, neither the 
importance placed on giving honest feedback nor the importance given to helping the student 
improve his/her writing was predicted by the compassion induction (ps > .25), thus ruling these 
items out as mediators of the relationship between compassion and prosocial lying. 
Experienced compassion mediated the effect of the compassion manipulation on 
prosocial lying. In order to establish that the observed effects on prosocial lying were driven by 
the experience of compassion and not some other difference between the two experimental 
conditions, we first tested whether prosocial lying was predicted by experienced compassion as 
measured by the manipulation check. Overall prosocial lying was significantly predicted by 
experienced compassion (β = .20, p < .001). This effect held for both participants in the 
compassion condition (p < .001), as well as those in the neutral condition (p = .01). We also 
tested whether the data were consistent with a mediation model in which the experience of 
compassion mediates the influence of the compassion (versus neutral) condition on prosocial 
lying. The data were indeed consistent with such a model: A mediation model with 20,000 
bootstrap resamples and bias-corrected confidence estimates revealed a significant indirect effect 
of the manipulation through experienced compassion on prosocial lying, β = .36, 95% CI [0.18, 
0.55]. 
In addition, we tested multiple mediation models containing experienced compassion and 
other items of the PANAS scale. A model containing experienced compassion, positive affect, 
and negative affect revealed a significant indirect effect of compassion, β = .35, 95 % CI [.13, 
.56], while confidence intervals around the indirect effects of positive and negative affect both 
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contained zero. We also ran a model containing experienced compassion and the items that are 
conceptually relevant to compassion experiences (inspired, distressed, upset, and guilty). There 
was again a significant indirect effect of experienced compassion, β = .34, 95% CI [.14, .55], but 
95% confidence intervals for the items “inspired,” “distressed,” “upset,” and “guilty” all 
contained zero. These analyses serve as a test of the specificity of the effect, indicating that 
increases in prosocial lying stemmed from participants’ experience of compassion, rather than 
other emotions. 
Controlling for positive affect, negative affect, and specific emotions did not account 
for the observed effects. The effect of the compassion manipulation on overall prosocial lying 
remained significant in a model controlling for positive and negative affect (p < .01), as well in a 
model controlling for every specific emotion item assessed in the PANAS (p < .001). 
Controlling for social perceptions of the writer did not account for the observed 
effects. Finally, we looked for differences in social perceptions resulting from the compassion 
and neutral manipulation to determine if they could explain the effects on prosocial lying. 
Overall, those in the compassion condition (M = 3.37, SD = 1.41) reported being more optimistic 
about the writer’s future as a graduate student than those in the neutral condition (M = 2.94, SD = 
1.34), t(399) = 3.24, p < .01. The writer in the compassion condition was also perceived as 
significantly more warm, agreeable, competent, open, likeable, trusting, trustworthy, and more 
likely to be female compared to the neutral condition (ps < .05). There were no significant 
differences between the two conditions in perceptions that the writer is smart, dominant, or 
confident (ps > .20). Importantly, the effect of the compassion manipulation on prosocial lying 
remained significant in a model controlling for each of these social perceptions significantly 
predicted by the compassion manipulation (p < .001). Furthermore, a multiple mediation model 
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with these perceptions entered as mediators revealed no significant indirect effects (all 
confidence intervals contained zero).  
Discussion 
Study 1 provided the first demonstration that compassion increases prosocial lying. By 
examining peer feedback, the experimental design in this study simulated a common context in 
which prosocial is likely to occur. Moreover, we identified a mechanism: The effect of 
compassion on prosocial lying was partially mediated by the importance placed on preventing 
emotional harm that could occur as a result of their feedback. Other emotions and social 
perceptions of the target did not drive the effect.  
Study 2:  
Trait Compassion Predicts Increased Prosocial Lying To Prevent Emotional Harm 
 Study 2 tested whether individual differences in trait compassion predict prosocial lying 
using the same feedback paradigm implemented in Study 1. Trait emotions are enduring aspects 
of a person’s personality that show stability over time and reflect elevated baseline levels of an 
emotion, increased tendencies to experience an emotion, and/or a decreased threshold for 
triggering the experience of an emotion (Rosenberg, 1998; Shiota, Keltner, & John, 2006). 
Investigating trait compassion thus offers another important glimpse into how prosocial lying 
effects are likely to emerge in the real world. 
Methods 
 Participants, design, and procedure. Participants were 145 Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(Mturk) workers located in the United States. Four participants were excluded for failing an 
attention check, and two participants were excluded for reporting disbelief that they were paired 
with another individual. This left a final sample of 139 participants (Mage = 35.5, 60.5% female). 
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Before collecting data, we had a target of 150 participants, which would give us an 80% power 
to detect a small-to-medium effect size of r = .22 at 𝛼 = .05. We used this effect size as a 
benchmark because we obtained comparable effect sizes in Study 1. 
No variables were manipulated in Study 2, thus eliminating the potential for demand 
characteristics that could arise from identification of the experimental manipulation. All 
participants completed the assessment of trait compassion, a filler task, the prosocial lying task, 
and the mechanism measures, as detailed below. 
Trait compassion. Trait compassion was measured using two validated scales 
administered in counterbalanced order: the Empathic Concern subscale of the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI-EC; Davis, 1983) and the compassion subscale of the Dispositional 
Positive Emotion Scales (DPES; Shiota et al., 2006). For the 7-item IRI-EC, participants 
indicated their agreement or disagreement (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) with items 
such as, “Other people’s misfortunes usually do not disturb me a great deal,” (reverse-scored) 
and “I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.” Internal 
reliability was high (α = .88). For the 5-item Compassion DPES, participants rated their 
agreement or disagreement (1 = disagree strongly, 7 = agree strongly) with items such as 
“Taking care of others gives me a warm feeling inside,” and “I am a very compassionate 
person.” Internal reliability was also high for this scale (α = .88). As expected, the two scales 
were highly correlated (r(137) = .86), so we standardized and averaged them to form the 
composite measure of trait compassion (α = .92). 
Filler task and demographics. In order to disguise our hypotheses and preclude the 
desire for consistent responding with the trait compassion measures, it was important to 
temporally separate the compassion measures from the focal dependent variables. Thus, we 
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provided participants with filler measures after assessing trait compassion. Here, participants 
answered demographic questions, then engaged in a task in which they formed neutral sentences 
from a series of scrambled words. 
Prosocial lying task. We used the prosocial lying task from Study 1, with the cover story 
adapted for Mturk participants. Specifically, participants were told that we were interested in 
assessing Mturk workers’ (those who participate in tasks on Mturk) perspectives on Mturk 
workers’ writing. Participants were informed that they would be paired with another Mturk 
worker, and that this worker had been asked to write a short essay about the benefits of Mturk for 
both workers and requesters (those who post tasks on Mturk). As in Study 1, participants were 
informed that the purpose of the task was to let the researcher know the quality of the writing, 
and also to determine whether the essay should be included in an introductory manual for people 
potentially interested in using Mturk. 
Similarly to Study 1, participants were shown the Mturk worker’s initials and short 
introductory message. They then learned about the same criteria for evaluating specific essay 
attributes that were used in Study 1 (i.e., focus, logic, organization, support, mechanics). Next, 
participants provided private evaluations of the essay, which was rated in a pretest by Jampol and 
Zayas (2016) to be of low quality (M = 22.20, SD = 19.20 on a 0 [worst] to 100 [best] scale). 
The evaluation measures implemented here were also similar to those used in Study 1, with 
minor changes. In Study 2, all measures were assessed on 0 to 100 scales. Participants rated the 
quality of the essay (0 = worst, 100 = best), the five essay attributes (0 = worst, 100 = best; α = 
.74), and the degree to which they would recommend the essay to be published in an introductory 
manual for online research (recommendation; 0 = very unlikely, 100 = very likely). The essay 
was provided on the screen while participants made their ratings. 
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After giving their initial, private evaluations, participants were asked to provide feedback 
to the writer about the quality of his/her essay. Before they gave their feedback, we presented 
participants with a similar explanation from Study 1 for why they would provide the feedback—
that is, that their feedback was important because it could help the writer improve his/her essay 
before submitting it “into a future HIT [survey on Mturk] in which they can earn a bonus [extra 
money].” As in Study 1, we presented this information in order to make the benefits of honesty 
salient and to reduce potential demand effects. 
Participants then evaluated the essay on the same three measures as before, with the 
addition of an on-screen reminder that these ratings would be shared with the essay writer. The 
difference between the shared ratings and the private ratings on each evaluation criterion (essay 
quality, attributes, and recommendation) again served as our measures of prosocial lying. These 
three measures of prosocial lying were averaged to form a composite measure of overall 
prosocial lying (α = .62).  
Mechanism: Harm prevention. Following the prosocial lying task, we asked participants 
the same question from Study 1 to assess the hypothesized mechanism—an enhanced focus on 
harm prevention—except that the writer was now referred to as a “worker” instead of a 
“student.” Specifically, participants were asked, “When you were giving feedback to the worker 
with whom you were paired during the second round of grading, how important was it for you to 
prevent any emotional harm or negative feelings that might have occurred as a result of your 
feedback?” (1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely important). They were also asked the same 
two questions from Study 1 to assess two alternative mechanisms: the importance placed on 
giving honest feedback, and on giving feedback that would help the worker improve his/her 
writing (1 = not at all important, 7 = extremely important).  




Overall levels of prosocial lying. Once again, the prosocial lying task resulted in 
prosocial lying. Positive difference scores for overall prosocial lying as well as each evaluation 
criterion indicated that participants inflated their ratings when they would be shared with the 
writer, compared to their private evaluations (Moverall = +3.51, SDoverall = 7.55; Mquality = +3.25, 
SDquality = 10.84; Mattributes = +1.08, SDattributes = 7.87; Mrecommendation = +6.19, SDrecommendation = 
11.06). Additionally, t-tests revealed that difference scores for quality and recommendation 
measures significantly differed from zero (ps < .001), though difference scores for the attributes 
measure did not differ significantly from zero (p = .11). 
Trait compassion predicts increased prosocial lying. To test our main hypothesis, we 
first examined correlations between trait compassion and overall prosocial lying. Because the 
distributions of trait compassion scores were skewed (most participants rated themselves as 
relatively high in compassion), we conducted non-parametric Spearman rank-order correlations. 
Consistent with our predictions, trait compassion was significantly correlated with overall 
prosocial lying, ρ(137) = .17, p = .04. We then examined how prosocial lying correlated with the 
three evaluation criteria that comprised the composite measure. These analyses revealed a 
significant positive correlation between compassion and prosocial lying about essay quality, 
ρ(137) = .18, p = .03, and recommendation, ρ(137) = .21, p =.01. The relationship between trait 
compassion and prosocial lying about the essay attributes was not significant (p > .25).  
Importance placed on harm prevention partially mediated the relationship between 
trait compassion and prosocial lying. The relationship between compassion and our 
hypothesized mediator—the importance placed on preventing emotional harm or negative 
feelings—was significant, ρ(137) = .28, p < .01. The relationship between importance placed on 
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harm prevention and overall prosocial lying was also significant, ρ(137) = .23, p < .01. As such, 
we tested whether the importance placed on preventing emotional harm mediated the relationship 
between trait compassion and prosocial lying. Consistent with Study 1, a mediation model with 
20,000 bootstrap resamples indicated that the desire to prevent harm was a partial mediator of 
this relationship, β = .36, 95% CI [.09, .86] (See Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. The relationship between compassion and prosocial lying as mediated by the 
importance placed on preventing emotional harm. Regression coefficients are unstandardized. 
Coefficient in parentheses represents the relationship between compassion and prosocial lying 









Indirect Effect: ! = .36, 95%*CI*[.09, .86]
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
28 
Unlike in Study 1, however, compassion also predicted the importance placed on helping 
the worker improve his/her writing, ρ(137) = .25, p < .01, and the importance placed on giving 
honest feedback, ρ(137) = .20, p = .02. Prosocial lying was significantly predicted by the desire 
to provide honest feedback, ρ(137) = -.30, p < .001, and marginally predicted by the desire help 
the worker improve, ρ(137) = -.15, p = .07. Therefore, we ran a multiple mediation model 
examining all three of these potential mediators simultaneously. There was again a significant 
indirect effect of the importance placed on harm prevention, β = .27, 95% CI [.04, .73]. 
However, confidence intervals for the indirect effects of the importance placed on helping the 
writer improve and on being honest both contained zero, thus ruling these out as mediators of the 
relationship between trait compassion and prosocial lying.  
Discussion 
In Study 2, trait compassion predicted increased prosocial lying. While this study 
implemented a correlational design, the results are consistent with those of Study 1, thus offering 
more evidence for the positive relationship between compassion and prosocial lying. Further 
supporting this evidence is the identification of the same underlying mechanism in Studies 1 and 
2. In both of these studies, the desire to prevent emotional harm partially mediated the 
relationship between trait compassion and prosocial lying, rather than alternative mechanisms.  
Study 3:  
Compassion Increases Prosocial Lies That Promote the Gains of Others But Not the Self 
Whereas Studies 1 and 2 examined how compassion influences and relates to lies that 
prevent harm to others, Study 3 instead examines lies that promote positive outcomes for others. 
Specifically, Study 3 investigated whether experimentally-induced compassion would increase 
lies that procure financial gains of others—in this case, a charity. By examining prosocial lying 
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in a different context, Study 3 helps to assess the external validity of the effects seen in Studies 1 
and 2. Moreover, in this study, we examined a third form of compassion by testing the effect of 
incidental state compassion on prosocial lying. That is, we manipulated compassion that was 
unrelated to the subsequent target of a prosocial lie. Testing the effects of incidental compassion 
on prosocial lying offers another key glimpse into how prosocial lying might unfold in the real 
world, as emotions can have spillover effects on decision-making in a variety of domains (e.g., 
Han et al., 2007). Lastly, we tested discriminant validity by investigating both prosocial and 
selfish lies, predicting moderation such that compassion would increase prosocial lies, but either 
decrease or have no effect on selfish lies.  
Methods 
Participants, design, and procedure. Participants were 455 undergraduates from a large 
U.S. public university. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 
(Emotion: compassion vs. neutral) x 2 (Lie Type: prosocial vs. selfish) between-subjects design. 
Ten participants were excluded due to a computer malfunction, three were excluded for being 
familiar with the lying task, six were excluded for guessing the hypothesis of the study, and four 
were excluded for displaying consistent responding that demonstrated a lack of understanding or 
concern for the task (by giving the payoff-minimizing response for the first 100 trials of the 
task). This left a final sample of 432 (Mage = 21.3, 49.2% female). Before collecting data, we had 
a target sample size of 460, or 115 per cell. This would give us an 80% power to detect a small-
to-medium effect size of d = .37 at 𝛼 = .05. We used this effect size as a benchmark because it 
was just below the effect size for the effect of compassion on prosocial lying observed in Study 
1. All participants received course credit in exchange for participation; additional incentive 
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payments were made to a random selection of 10% of participants according their responses in 
the lying task (it was possible to gain up to $10 in incentive payments for the self or for charity).  
To obscure the study’s purpose, participants were first told that they would be 
participating in a study about “how personality and visual stimuli influence memory.” To bolster 
the cover story about the memory task, participants were told, “For this study, we are 
investigating how different visual stimuli affect memory. You will view a series of photos and a 
short movie. You will later be asked to recall aspects of the photos and movie, so please pay 
close attention.” Next, participants filled out the Big Five Personality Inventory (BFI; John, 
Donahue, & Kentle, 1991), which assessed control variables. Then, participants received the 
compassion or neutral emotion induction, completed the lying task (where lies benefited the self 
or others), and finally reported on their experienced emotions. 
 Big Five Personality Inventory (control variables). Participants completed the 44-item 
BFI on 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) scales. We measured agreeableness as a 
control variable because of its potential relationship with decisions to lie prosocially, and 
because agreeableness, along with extraversion, tends to covary with positive emotionality (John 
& Srivastava, 1999). Neuroticism was measured as a control variable because of its empirical 
links with negative emotionality. We additionally included conscientiousness and openness to 
experience as control variables because they make up the other two major dimensions of 
personality. 
Emotion manipulation – compassion vs. neutral. Next, participants received the 
emotion manipulation. Those in the compassion condition viewed a validated 15-slide 
compassion induction (photographs depicted helplessness and vulnerability; Oveis et al., 2010) 
followed immediately by a validated 46-second film induction of compassion (about child 
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malnutrition and starvation; Côté et al., 2011). Importantly, the slides and video selected were 
not connected to the target organization of the prosocial lying task, nor was it plausible based on 
photo/video content or procedure that participants would later believe that they were benefiting 
the individuals depicted in the compassion induction. 
 Participants in the neutral condition viewed 15 neutral slides from the International 
Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999) immediately followed by a 
46-second clip from the film All the President’s Men depicting two men talking in a 
courtroom—a clip that past research has shown to elicit a neutral state (Hewig et al., 2005). All 
stimuli used in the manipulation can be found in the Supplemental Material. 
Lying task – prosocial lies vs. selfish lies. Immediately after the emotion induction, 
participants engaged in a lying task adapted from Gino, Norton, and Ariely (2010). For this task, 
participants viewed a series of arrays of dots dispersed within a square. Each square had a 
diagonal line cutting it in half, such that some dots were displayed to the right of the diagonal, 
and some dots to the left of the diagonal. After a 1-second exposure to each trial, participants 
were asked report whether there were more dots to the left or the right of the diagonal by 
pressing one of two keys.  
Participants in the selfish lie condition were told that they would be paid 0.5 cents each 
time they reported that there were more dots on the left, and 5 cents for each time they reported 
that there were more dots on the right “because most people can easily identify the number of 
dots on the left side.” That is, they were incentivized to say that there were more dots on the right 
regardless of whether or not this was true. 
In the prosocial lie condition, participants received the same information, but were told 
that the money earned based on their responses would be donated to a real charity—the Against 
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Malaria Foundation. Participants in this condition were also given a short paragraph about the 
nature of the charity, which provides insecticide-treated mosquito nets for the prevention of 
malaria (see Supplemental Material for full description provided to participants). All money 
earned by participants in the prosocial lie condition was actually donated to the Against Malaria 
Foundation. 
Following Gino et al. (2010), all participants first performed 15 practice trials. After the 
practice phase, there were 200 trials divided into two blocks with 100 trials each. Each of the two 
blocks contained 34 trials in which there were clearly more dots on the left (a right-to-left ratio 
of less than 2/3), 50 trials in which it was ambiguous whether there were more dots on the left or 
the right (a right-to-left ratio greater than or equal to 2/3 and less than or equal to 3/2), and 16 
trials in which there were clearly more dots on the right (the ratio of the number of dots on the 
right to the number of dots on the left was greater than 3/2). As in Gino et al. (2010), clearly 
dishonest responses were defined as “more on the right” responses—the response that yielded 
the higher payoff—when there were clearly more dots on the left. Ambiguously dishonest 
responses were defined as “more on the right” responses when it was ambiguous whether there 
were more dots on the right or left. Honest responses were defined as “more on the right” 
responses when they were clearly more dots on the right.  
 Experienced emotions. Immediately following the lying task, participants completed the 
same measures of experienced emotions as in Study 1. Here, participants were asked to indicate 
the extent to which they experienced each emotion after viewing the slides and video. We once 
again calculated scores for positive affect (10 items, α = .89), negative affect (10 items, α = .90), 
and compassion (3 items, α = .90). All items were displayed in a randomized order. Due to a 
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programming error, only 269 of the 432 participants were asked about their experienced 
emotions. 
Results 
Manipulation check. As expected, the previously validated emotion induction 
successfully induced compassion. Participants in the compassion condition (M = 3.38, SD = 
0.98) reported more experienced compassion than those in the neutral condition (M = 1.62, SD = 
0.82), t(267) = 16.06, p < .001, d = 1.96.  
Prosocial and selfish lying. Overall, this procedure successfully produced prosocial and 
selfish lying. Those in the prosocial lie conditions exhibited on average 41.15 clearly dishonest 
responses (SD = 14.66) out of a potential 68 trials (60.51%), and 63.72 ambiguously dishonest 
responses (SD = 18.50) out of a potential 100 trials (63.72%). Those in the selfish lie conditions 
demonstrated on average 38.08 clearly dishonest responses (SD = 13.31) out of 68 trials (56.0 
%), and 60.13 ambiguously dishonest responses (SD = 17.02) out of 100 trials (60.13%).  
For each dependent variable (clearly dishonest responses, ambiguously dishonest 
responses, honest responses), we conducted a 2 (Emotion: compassion / neutral) x 2 (Lie Type: 
prosocial / selfish) ANOVA.3  
For clearly dishonest responses, as predicted, there was a significant Emotion x Lie Type 
interaction, F(1,428) = 6.51, p =.01, η2p = .01 (see Figure 4, Panel A). Participants in the 
compassion condition (M = 43.25, SD = 16.05) exhibited more clearly dishonest responses for 
the benefit of the charity (i.e., prosocial lying) than those in the neutral condition (M = 39.21, SD 
= 13.03), t(212) = 2.03, p = .04, d = .28. There was no statistically significant difference in 
                                                   
3 Repeated measures analyses with block (first vs. second) included as a factor are included in 
the Supplemental Material, though inclusion of block as a factor does not alter the results. 
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clearly dishonest responses for participants’ own monetary gain (i.e., selfish lying) between 
those in the compassion condition (M = 36.57, SD = 13.04) and those in the neutral condition (M 
= 39.38, SD = 13.45; p = .12). In addition, there was a main effect lie type, F(1,428) = 5.23, p 
=.01, η2p = .01. Those in the prosocial lie conditions (M = 41.15, SD = 14.66) demonstrated 
more clearly dishonest responses than those in the neutral conditions (M = 38.08, SD = 13.31). 
There was no main effect of emotion (p > .25).  
For ambiguously dishonest responses, similar results were obtained (see Figure 4, Panel 
B). As predicted, there was a significant Emotion x Lie Type interaction, F(1,428) = 5.96, p 
=.02, η2p = .01. Those in the compassion condition (M = 66.78, SD =20.29) exhibited more 
prosocial lying than those in the neutral condition (M = 60.89, SD =16.26), t(212) = 2.35, p = 
.02, d = .32. There was no statistically significant difference in selfish lying between those in the 
compassion condition (M = 58.83, SD = 16.39) and those in the neutral condition (M = 61.26, 
SD = 17.54; p > .25). There was also a main effect of lie type, F(1,428) = 4.37, p = .04, η2p = 
.01, such that participants engaged in more lying in the prosocial lie condition (M = 63.72, SD 
=18.50) than in the selfish lie condition (M = 60.14, SD = 17.02). There was no significant 
effect of emotion (p > .25). 
For honest responses, as predicted, there was no significant Emotion x Lie Type 
interaction (p > .25; see Figure 4, Panel C). There was also no main effect of lie type (p = .11) 
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Figure 4. The effect of incidental compassion on clearly dishonest responses (Panel A), 
ambiguously dishonest responses (Panel B), and honest responses (Panel C) for prosocial and 
selfish causes in Study 3. Error bars signify standard errors. Note: Maximum possible number of 
clearly dishonest, ambiguously dishonest, and honest responses was 68, 100, and 32, 
respectively. 
 
Experienced compassion predicted prosocial lying. As an additional test of the 
specificity of the observed effects, we examined whether prosocial lying was predicted by 
experienced compassion, as measured by our manipulation check. Experienced compassion 
marginally predicted clearly dishonest responses (p = .07), and significantly predicted 
ambiguously dishonest responses (p = .04). However, experienced compassion did not mediate 
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Controlling for positive affect, negative affect, and specific emotions did not account 
for the observed effects. To ensure that these effects were specific to compassion and were not 
due to related emotions or generalized positive or negative affect, we examined the effect of the 
compassion manipulation on prosocial lying with the inclusion of covariates to control for these 
other emotions. The effect of compassion on prosocial lying (for both clearly dishonest and 
ambiguously dishonest responses) held in models controlling for positive and negative affect (ps 
< .05), as well as in models controlling for all individual items of the PANAS (ps < .01).  
Personality traits did not account for the observed effects. The effect of compassion 
on prosocial lying (for both clearly dishonest and ambiguously dishonest responses) held in 
models simultaneously controlling for extraversion, agreeableness, neuroticism, 
conscientiousness, and openness (ps < .05). Thus, enduring personality traits could not account 
for the observed effects. 
Discussion 
Consistent with Studies 1 and 2, Study 3 found that incidental compassion increased 
prosocial lying. Critically, the compassion-eliciting stimuli were unrelated to the charity that 
benefited from participants’ dishonest behavior, and the compassion induction still increased 
prosocial lying.  
These results expand the findings of Studies 1 and 2 in several ways. First, Study 3 
employed a different operationalization of compassion, and also examined a different type of 
compassion. Using a large sample, we found that prosocial lying is not only associated with 
integral (Study 1) and trait (Study 2) compassion, but is also increased by incidental compassion 
(Study 3). These results offer further evidence for the causal influence of compassion on 
prosocial lying. Second, the use of another operationalization of prosocial lying in Study 3 
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bolsters support for the external validity of the effect. In addition to being associated with 
prosocial lying that prevents emotional harm in the context of providing performance feedback, 
compassion also increased prosocial lies that promoted financial benefits for a humanitarian aid 
charity. This phenomenon could present itself in the real world in the form of a charity employee 
lying on tax returns to reserve more funds for humanitarian work. Third, by examining two types 
of lies—selfish and prosocial lies—we demonstrated that the beneficiary of the lie is an 
important moderator of the relationship between compassion and deception. Compassion 
increased prosocial lying, but not selfish lying. Furthermore, we again ruled out important 
alternative explanations: other emotions did not explain these effects, nor did personality traits 
linked to positive affect (extraversion and agreeableness), negative affect (neuroticism), or 
prosocial behavior (agreeableness).  
General Discussion 
The present studies provide the first investigation of the emotional underpinnings of 
prosocial lying. Across studies, we examined compassion at three different levels, demonstrating 
that both integrally (Study 1) and incidentally (Study 3) induced state compassion causally 
increase prosocial lying, and that individual differences in trait compassion (Study 2) are 
positively associated with prosocial lying. Not only did we implement multiple 
operationalizations of compassion, but we also studied two different types prosocial lies: those 
that prevent emotional harm, and those that promote financial gain for others. All studies 
investigated actual lying behavior, rather than attitudes toward lying or hypotheticals. 
Furthermore, we ruled out alternative explanations across studies that could potentially account 
for our results—that is, we found that the observed increases in prosocial lying were due to 
compassion specifically, rather than other discrete emotions, generalized positive or negative 
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affect, or social perceptions of the target. Together, this research demonstrates how compassion 
increases prosocial lying. 
In addition to uncovering the relationship between compassion and prosocial lying, we 
also identified a mechanism behind this effect. In Studies 1 and 2, the effect of compassion on 
prosocial lying was partially mediated by the importance placed on preventing emotional harm. 
Compassion has been shown to increase prosocial behaviors associated with both harm 
prevention (e.g., Batson et al., 1981) as well as non-harm-related welfare promotion (e.g., 
Condon & DeSteno, 2011). However, this mechanism suggests that compassion may make 
individuals particularly attuned to the preventing suffering of others, even when additional routes 
to helping others are available (e.g., providing honest feedback).  
 Moreover, in Study 3, we showed that compassion increased lies that helped a charity, 
but had no effect on lies that financially benefited participants themselves. This suggests that 
compassion does not exert global effects on deception, but rather that the beneficiary of the lie is 
an important moderator of the relationship between compassion and dishonesty. Although the 
present investigation is focused on how compassion influences prosocial lies, it is worth noting 
that, to our knowledge, these are the first data to investigate whether compassion influences 
selfish lies. Thus, while compassion may promote prosocial behavior, this emotion may not have 
any appreciable (negative) effect on antisocial behavior. 
This work contributes to the nascent literature on prosocial lying in several ways. First, 
no research has yet examined emotion as a causal driver of prosocial lying.  Previous research on 
prosocial lying has focused on identifying contexts in which these lies are told (e.g., DePaulo et 
al., 1996), responses to those who tell prosocial lies (e.g., Levine & Schweitzer, 2014), or 
qualitative assessments of reasons for lying (e.g., DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). Our research extends 
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theory on prosocial lying by providing the first demonstration that compassion is related to and 
causally influences prosocial lying. In addition, this research provides insight into an important 
real world context in which prosocial lies are told. Past work has often operationalized prosocial 
lying using economic games, which afford experimental control but are somewhat limited in 
external validity (e.g., Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Levine & Schweitzer, 2014; 2015). Given the 
usefulness of these games for cleanly differentiating prosocial lies from other types of lies (e.g., 
selfish lies), we borrowed from this approach for our lying task in Study 3. However, by 
examining prosocial lying in the form of overly inflated person-to-person feedback in Studies 1 
and 2, we shed light on how compassion influences behavior in a common situation that affords 
the opportunity for prosocial lying.  
This work also informs scholarly understanding of compassion and how it shapes ethical 
behavior. While compassion’s positive influence on prosocial behavior has been widely 
documented, little work has examined how compassion affects moral decision making, and no 
work has examined how compassion influences behavior when different ethical principles are 
pitted against one another. According to Moral Foundations Theory (Graham et al., 2011; Haidt 
& Graham, 2007; see also Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park; 1997), people across cultures 
conceive of actions and beliefs in several different domains as morally relevant. Lying may be 
regarded as a violation of the principle of honesty (Graham et al., 2015) and the decision to tell a 
prosocial lie presents a conflict between the principle of honesty and the principle of harm and 
care—the obligation to aid the welfare of others. Our work suggests that compassion might cause 
people to consider harm and care more heavily in ethically ambiguous situations. More research 
would help to illuminate how compassion influences the weighting of harm/care relative to other 
moral values across a broader spectrum of moral dilemmas.  
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In addition, this research contributes to a growing body of work that highlights how, 
despite the prosocial benefits it often affords, compassion can sometimes lead individuals to act 
contrary to what is truly in others’ best interests (e.g., Bloom, 2014; Cameron & Payne, 2011). 
Similarly to how compassion draws attention and resources to identifiable victims rather than to 
comparably greater atrocities (Small, Loewenstein, & Slovic, 2007), our results suggest that 
compassion may bias individuals toward alleviating immediate emotional harm rather than 
attending to others’ longer-term goals (e.g., performance improvement resulting from critical 
feedback). However, it may also be that when honesty is perceived to result in future benefits for 
a target that far outweigh the benefits of lying, compassion could lead individuals to be more 
honest. While recent work has begun to address how positive emotions such as gratitude 
influence temporal discounting (DeSteno, Li, Dickens, & Lerner, 2014; Dickens & DeSteno, 
2016), further research is necessary to understand how compassion influences valuations of 
others’ short-term and long-term goals.  
Another area for future research lies in how the relationship between the lie teller and the 
target of the lie moderates the effect of compassion on prosocial lying. One limitation of the 
present studies is that participants were given the opportunity to lie only to strangers. As such, it 
is critical to determine whether these effects generalize to closer relationships. The relationship 
between compassion and prosocial lying may differ depending on the in-group/out-group 
membership of the lie target, or the lie teller’s perceived closeness to the target. People feel more 
compassion towards those to whom they are closely related (Cialdini et al., 1997), and people 
also tell more prosocial lies to close others than selfish lies (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998). Thus, it is 
possible that an interaction exists between compassion and the closeness of the lie target on 
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prosocial lying. If this is the case, then compassion would exert an even stronger influence on 
prosocial lies told between friends, coworkers, or relationship partners.  
 According to Ralph Waldo Emerson (1888), “the purpose of life…is to be honorable, to 
be compassionate, to have it make some difference that you have lived and lived well.” 
Unfortunately, Emerson did not offer guidelines for how one should behave when helping others 
requires an act that some may view as dishonorable, such as lying. The present research suggests 
that compassion may provide that moral compass by leading individuals to tell lies that are 
intended to benefit others. Indeed, many people likely lie not in spite of their concern for others, 




























Ashford, S. J., & Cummings, L. L. (1983). Feedback as an individual resource: Personal 
 strategies of creating information. Organizational Behavior and Human 
 Performance, 32(3), 370-398. 
Batson, C. D. (1991). The altruism question: Toward a social-psychological answer. Hillsdale, 
 NJ: Erlbaum. 
Batson, C. D., Duncan, B. D., Ackerman, P., Buckley, T., & Birch, K. (1981). Is empathic 
 emotion a source of altruistic motivation?. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 40(2), 290-302. 
Batson, C. D., Sager, K., Garst, E., Kang, M., Rubchinsky, K., & Dawson, K. (1997). Is 
 empathy-induced helping due to self–other merging?. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 73(3), 495-509. 
Batson, C. D., & Shaw, L. (1991). Evidence for altruism: Toward a pluralism of prosocial  
 motives. Psychological Inquiry, 2, 107-122. 
Bloom, P. (2014). Against Empathy. Boston Review. Retrieved from 
 http://bostonreview.net/forum/paul-bloom-against-empathy. 
Boles, T. L., Croson, R. T., & Murnighan, J. K. (2000). Deception and retribution in repeated 
 ultimatum bargaining. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83(2), 
 235-259. 
Burgoon, J. K., & Buller, D. B. (1994). Interpersonal deception: III. Effects of deceit on 
 perceived communication and nonverbal behavior dynamics. Journal of Nonverbal 
 Behavior, 18(2), 155-184. 
Broomfield, K. A., Robinson, E. J., & Robinson, W. P. (2002). Children's understanding about  
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
44 
 white lies. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 20(1), 47-65. 
Brummelman, E., Thomaes, S., Orobio, D. C. B., Overbeek, G., & Bushman, B. J. (2014). " 
 That's not just beautiful--that's incredibly beautiful!": the adverse impact of inflated 
 praise on children with low self-esteem. Psychological Science, 25(3), 728-735. 
Cameron, C. D., & Payne, B. K. (2011). Escaping affect: How motivated emotion regulation  
 creates insensitivity to mass suffering. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,  
 100, 1-15.  
Cameron, C. D., & Payne, B. K. (2012). The cost of callousness: Regulating compassion 
 influences the moral self-concept. Psychological Science,23(3), 225-229. 
Cialdini, R. B., Brown, S. L., Lewis, B. P., Luce, C., & Neuberg, S. L. (1997). Reinterpreting the 
 empathy–altruism relationship: When one into one equals oneness. Journal of 
 Personality and Social Psychology, 73(3), 481-494. 
Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. Psychological Bulletin, 112(1), 155-159. 
Condon, P., & DeSteno, D. (2011). Compassion for one reduces punishment for another. Journal  
 of Experimental Social Psychology, 47(3), 698-701. 
Côté, S., Kraus, M. W., Cheng, B. H., Oveis, C., Van der Löwe, I., Lian, H., & Keltner, D.  
  (2011). Social power facilitates the effect of prosocial orientation on empathic accuracy.  
  Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 217-232. 
Davis, M. H. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a  
  multidimensional approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113- 
  126. 
DePaulo, B. M., & Kashy, D. A. (1998). Everyday lies in close and casual relationships. Journal  
 of Personality and Social Psychology, 74(1), 63-79. 
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
45 
DePaulo, B. M., Kashy, D. A., Kirkendol, S. E., Wyer, M. M., & Epstein, J. A. (1996). Lying in  
 everyday life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(5), 979-995. 
DeSteno, D., Li, Y., Dickens, L., & Lerner, J. S. (2014). Gratitude: a tool for reducing economic 
 impatience. Psychological Science, 25(6), 1262-1267. 
Dickens, L., & DeSteno, D. (2016). The grateful are patient: Heightened daily gratitude is 
 associated with attenuated temporal discounting. Emotion, 16(4), 421-425. 
Eisenberg, N. (1991). Meta-analytic contributions to the literature on prosocial 
 behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17(3), 273-282. 
Eisenberg, N. (2002). Empathy-related emotional responses, altruism, and their 
 socialization. Visions of Compassion: Western Scientists and Tibetan Buddhists Examine 
 Human Nature, 135, 131-164. 
Eisenberg, N., Fabes, R. A., Miller, P. A., Fultz, J., Shell, R., Mathy, R. M., & Reno, R. R. 
 (1989). Relation of sympathy and personal distress to prosocial behavior: a multimethod 
 study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,57(1), 55-66. 
Ellis, S., Mendel, R., & Aloni-­‐Zohar, M. (2009). The Effect of Accuracy of Performance 
 Evaluation on Learning from Experience: The Moderating Role of After-­‐Event 
 Reviews. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 39(3), 541-563. 
Erat, S., & Gneezy, U. (2012). White lies. Management Science, 58(4), 723-733. 
Emerson, R. W. (1888). Select Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson (Vol. 33). W. Scott. 
Gino, F., Ayal, S., & Ariely, D. (2013). Self-serving altruism? The lure of unethical actions that 
 benefit others. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 93, 285-292. 
Gino, F., Norton, M. I., & Ariely, D. (2010). The counterfeit self: The deceptive costs of faking 
 it. Psychological Science, 21(5), 712-720. 
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
46 
Gino, F., & Pierce, L. (2009). Dishonesty in the name of equity. Psychological Science, 20(9), 
 1153-1160. 
Graham, J., Meindl, P., Koleva, S., Iyer, R., & Johnson, K. M. (2015). When values and behavior  
 conflict: Moral pluralism and intrapersonal moral hypocrisy. Social and Personality 
 Psychology Compass, 9(3), 158-170. 
Graham, J., Nosek, B. A., Haidt, J., Iyer, R., Koleva, S., & Ditto, P. H. (2011). Mapping the 
 moral domain. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 101(2), 366-385. 
Goetz, J. L., Keltner, D., & Simon-Thomas, E. (2010). Compassion: An evolutionary analysis  
and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin, 136(3), 351-374. 
Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith  
 (Eds.), Handbook of Affective Sciences (pp. 852-870). Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Haidt, J., & Graham, J. (2007). When morality opposes justice: Conservatives have moral 
 intuitions that liberals may not recognize. Social Justice Research, 20(1), 98-116. 
Han, S., Lerner, J. S., & Keltner, D. (2007). Feelings and consumer decision making: The 
 appraisal-tendency framework. Journal of Consumer Psychology, 17(3), 158-168. 
Hertenstein, M. J., Keltner, D., App, B., Bulleit, B. A., & Jaskolka, A. R. (2006). Touch 
 Communicates Distinct Emotions. Emotion, 6(3), 528-533. 
Haselton, M. G., Buss, D. M., Oubaid, V., & Angleitner, A. (2005). Sex, lies, and strategic 
 interference: The psychology of deception between the sexes. Personality and Social 
 Psychology Bulletin, 31(1), 3-23. 
Hewig J., Hagemann, D., Seifert, J., Gollwitzer, M., Naumann, E., & Bartussek, D. (2005). A 
 revised film set for the study of basic emotions. Cognition & Emotion, 19(7), 1095-1109. 
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
47 
Heyman, G. D., Luu, D. H., & Lee, K. (2009). Parenting by lying. Journal of Moral 
 Education, 38(3), 353-369. 
Hillman, L. W., Schwandt, D. R., & Bartz, D. E. (1990). Enhancing staff members' performance 
 through feedback and coaching. Journal of Management Development, 9(3), 20-27. 
Horberg, E. J., Oveis, C., & Keltner, D. (2011). Emotions as moral amplifiers: An appraisal 
 tendency approach to the influences of distinct emotions upon moral judgment. Emotion 
 Review, 3(3), 237-244. 
Hyland, F. (1998). The impact of teacher written feedback on individual writers. Journal of 
 Second Language Writing, 7(3), 255-286. 
Ilgen, D. R., Fisher, C. D., & Taylor, M. S. (1979). Consequences of Individual Feedback on 
 Behavior in Organizations. Journal of Applied Psychology, 64(4), 349-371. 
Jampol, L. E., & Zayas, V. (2016). The dark side of white lies: Underperforming women are told 
 more white lies than men during performance feedback. Manuscript in preparation. 
John, O. P., Donahue, E. M., & Kentle, R. (1991). The ‘Big Five Inventory—version 4a and, 
 54. Berkeley, CA: University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Personality and Social 
 Research. 
John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and 
 theoretical perspectives. Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2(1999), 102-
 138. 
Lang, P. J., Bradley, M. M., & Cuthbert, B. N. (1999). International affective picture system  
 (IAPS): Instruction manual and affective ratings. The Center for Research in 
 Psychophysiology, University of Florida. 
Lazarus, R.S. (1991). Emotion and Adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
48 
Levine, E. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2014). Are liars ethical? On the tension between  
 benevolence and honesty. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 53, 107-117. 
Levine, E. E., & Schweitzer, M. E. (2015). Prosocial lies: When deception breeds 
 trust. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 126, 88-106. 
Lewis, M., & Saarni, C. (Eds.). (1993). Lying and deception in everyday life. Guilford Press. 
Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (1990). Work motivation and satisfaction: Light at the end of the 
 tunnel. Psychological Science, 1(4), 240-246. 
Loewenstein, G., & Small, D. A. (2007). The Scarecrow and the Tin Man: The Vicissitudes of 
 Human Sympathy and Caring. Review of General Psychology,11(2), 112-126. 
Lupoli, M.J., Levine, E.E., Greenberg, A.E. (2016). Paternalistic Lies. Working Paper. 
Nussbaum, M. (1996). Compassion: The basic social emotion. Social Philosophy and 
 Policy, 13(01), 27-58. 
McCornack, S. A., & Levine, T. R. (1990). When lies are uncovered: Emotional and relational 
 outcomes of discovered deception. Communications Monographs, 57(2), 119-138. 
Omoto A. M., Malsch, A. M., Barraza J. A. (2009). Compassionate acts: Motivations for and  
 correlates of volunteerism among older adults. In B. Fehr B, S. Sprecher S, L.G. 
 Underwood (Eds.), The Science of Compassionate Love: Theory, Research, and 
 Applications (pp. 257–282). Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Oveis, C., Cohen, A. B., Gruber, J., Shiota, M. N., Haidt, J., & Keltner, D. (2009). Resting 
 respiratory sinus arrhythmia is associated with tonic positive emotionality. Emotion, 9(2), 
 265-270. 
Oveis, C., Horberg, E. J., & Keltner, D. (2010). Compassion, pride, and social intuitions of self-
 other similarity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98(4), 618-630. 
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
49 
Rosenberg, E. L. (1998). Levels of analysis and the organization of affect. Review of General 
 Psychology, 2(3), 247-270. 
Rudolph, U., Roesch, S., Greitemeyer, T., & Weiner, B. (2004). A meta-­‐analytic review of help 
 giving and aggression from an attributional perspective: Contributions to a general theory 
 of motivation. Cognition and Emotion, 18(6), 815-848. 
Rynes, S. L., Bartunek, J. M., Dutton, J. E., & Margolis, J. D. (2012). Care and compassion 
 through an organizational lens: Opening up new possibilities. Academy of Management 
 Review, 37(4), 503-523. 
Saslow, L. R., Willer, R., Feinberg, M., Piff, P. K., Clark, K., Keltner, D., & Saturn, S. R. 
 (2013). My brother’s keeper? Compassion predicts generosity more among less religious 
 individuals. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 4(1), 31-38. 
Shweder, R., Much, N., Mahapatra, M., & Park, L. (1997). Divinity and the “Big Three" 
 Explanations of Suffering. Morality and Health, 119, 119-169. 
Schweitzer, M. E., Hershey, J. C., & Bradlow, E. T. (2006). Promises and lies: Restoring 
 violated trust. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 101(1), 1-19. 
Shiota, M. N., Keltner, D., & John, O. P. (2006). Positive emotion dispositions differentially  
 associated with Big Five personality and attachment style. The Journal of Positive 
 Psychology, 1(2), 61-71. 
Singer, T., & Steinbeis, N. (2009). Differential Roles of Fairness-­‐and Compassion-­‐Based  
 Motivations for Cooperation, Defection, and Punishment. Annals of the New York 
 Academy of Sciences, 1167(1), 41-50. 
Slovic, P. (2007). " If I look at the mass I will never act": Psychic numbing and 
 genocide. Judgment and Decision Making, 2(2), 79-95. 
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
50 
Small, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2003). Helping a victim or helping the victim: Altruism and 
 identifiability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26(1), 5-16. 
Small, D. A., Loewenstein, G., & Slovic, P. (2007). Sympathy and callousness: The impact of  
 deliberative thought on donations to identifiable and statistical victims. Organizational 
 Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 102(2), 143-153. 
Stellar, J. E., Cohen, A., Oveis, C., & Keltner, D. (2015). Affective and Physiological Responses 
 to the Suffering of Others: Compassion and Vagal Activity. Journal of Personality and 
 Social Psychology, 108(4), 572-585. 
 Stellar, J. E., Manzo, V. M., Kraus, M. W., & Keltner, D. (2012). Class and compassion: 
 socioeconomic factors predict responses to suffering. Emotion, 12(3), 449-459. 
Stellar, J., Feinberg, M., & Keltner, D. (2014). When the selfish suffer: evidence for selective  
 prosocial emotional and physiological responses to suffering egoists. Evolution and  
 Human Behavior, 35(2), 140-147. 
Stiff, J. B., Kim, H. J., & Ramesh, C. N. (1992). Truth biases and aroused suspicion in relational 
 deception. Communication Research, 19(3), 326-345. 
Stürmer, S., Snyder, M., Kropp, A., & Siem, B. (2006). Empathy-motivated helping: The 
 moderating role of group membership. Personality and Social Psychology 
 Bulletin, 32(7), 943-956. 
Talwar, V., Gordon, H. M., & Lee, K. (2007). Lying in the elementary school years: verbal 
 deception and its relation to second-order belief understanding. Developmental 
 Psychology, 43(3), 804-810. 
COMPASSION AND PROSOCIAL LYING 
 
51 
Tyler, J. M., Feldman, R. S., & Reichert, A. (2006). The price of deceptive behavior: Disliking 
 and lying to people who lie to us. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 42(1), 69-
 77. 
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2011a). Synchrony and the social tuning of 
 compassion. Emotion, 11(2), 262. 
Valdesolo, P., & DeSteno, D. (2011b). The virtue in vice: Short-sightedness in the study of 
 moral emotions. Emotion Review, 3(3), 276-277. 
Van Kleef, G. A., Oveis, C., van der Löwe, I., LuoKogan, A., Goetz, J., & Keltner, D. (2008). 
 Power, distress, and compassion turning a blind eye to the suffering of 
 others. Psychological Science, 19(12), 1315-1322. 
Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures 
 of positive and negative affect: the PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social 
 Psychology, 54(6), 1063-1070. 
Wiltermuth, S. S. (2011). Cheating more when the spoils are split. Organizational Behavior and 
 Human Decision Processes, 115(2), 157-168.  
Wispé, L. (1986). The distinction between sympathy and empathy: To call forth a concept, a 
 word is needed. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50(2), 314-321. 
Zahn-Waxler, C., Radke-Yarrow, M., Wagner, E., & Chapman, M. (1992). Development of 
 concern for others. Developmental Psychology, 28(1), 126-136. 
